The Next Frontier: Emerging Technologies in Anti-Corruption

The next wave of anti-corruption efforts is being shaped by emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, and blockchain, which offer powerful new capabilities for prevention, detection, and enforcement. AI and machine learning algorithms can analyze vast datasets to detect anomalies and patterns indicative of corruption, such as suspicious bidding behaviors in procurement or unusual financial transactions. They can automate the review of thousands of documents, cross-reference information across disparate databases, and help investigators prioritize leads, dramatically increasing the efficiency of anti-corruption agencies. Blockchain technology offers the potential for immutable and transparent ledgers. This can be applied to create secure asset registries that make it harder to conceal illicit wealth, transparent supply chains that prevent fraud, and tamper-proof whistleblower platforms that protect anonymity.

However, this technological frontier is not without significant risks. The effectiveness of AI is entirely dependent on the quality and integrity of the data it is trained on; biased or incomplete data can lead to discriminatory and inaccurate outcomes. Many AI systems operate as “black boxes,” making their decision-making processes opaque and difficult to challenge, which is problematic in legal and administrative contexts. Furthermore, the literature consistently warns that ICT is not a “panacea”. Investment in these technologies can itself be corrupted, and the tools can be misused or provide new opportunities for sophisticated forms of graft.

A critical examination of this “digital panacea” narrative reveals a distinct and potentially problematic focus. The dominant model in both academic and institutional literature frames transparency as a “supply-side” issue: the primary task is for governments to supply more data, more digital services, and more sophisticated platforms. This is evident in the focus on government-led implementations like e-procurement systems and OGD portals. This perspective, however, often under-appreciates the crucial “demand-side” prerequisites for these tools to be effective. The mere existence of a transparency portal is insufficient if citizens lack the digital literacy to access it, the analytical skills to interpret the data, or the political space to act on their findings without fear of reprisal. Indeed, evidence suggests that a “mismatch of supply and demand of data” and a lack of resources can render such portals ineffective. This is particularly true when confronting grand corruption, which is often protected by powerful elites who have no interest in genuine reform. Therefore, the supply-side model overlooks the fact that transparency is not merely a technical output but a political process that requires an engaged, capable, and empowered civil society to translate data into accountability.

Section 2: The Trust Deficit: Does Digitalization Truly Rebuild Public Confidence?

While the potential of e-governance to enhance transparency is well-documented, the subsequent leap to rebuilding public trust is far more tenuous. The assumption that increased transparency and efficiency will automatically translate into greater public confidence in government is a central, yet largely unproven, tenet of the digital governance doctrine. A critical examination of the evidence reveals a complex, contingent, and often contradictory relationship between the adoption of digital platforms and the cultivation of public trust. The data suggests that technology alone is rarely sufficient to overcome deep-seated institutional mistrust.

2.1. The Ambiguous and Contradictory Evidence

The academic literature on the impact of e-government on public trust is characterized by mixed findings. Some studies do find a positive correlation. A review of literature noted that digital government in Bahrain was perceived to increase public trust by minimizing corrupt practices, and other studies have linked open government and e-government adoption to reduced corruption and, by extension, improved public well-being and trust. Research has also shown a statistically significant relationship between the use of a local government website and other positive assessments of government, suggesting e-government can be a tool to improve citizen evaluations.

However, this is far from a settled consensus. A significant body of research points to an insignificant or non-existent link. A notable study drawing on survey data from Australia and New Zealand found that general public trust in government was not correlated with trust in the specific facets of e-government service provision. This suggests that citizens are capable of making a distinction between the efficiency of a digital tool and the trustworthiness of the institution behind it. Other studies have similarly found an “insignificant association” between the mere use of e-government services and overall trust in government. This body of conflicting evidence indicates that the relationship is not a simple, linear one. The impact of digitalization on trust appears to be mediated by a host of other contextual factors.

2.2. Critical Mediating Factors

The effectiveness of digital platforms in building trust is not inherent in the technology itself but is shaped by the social, political, and digital environment into which it is introduced. Three factors are particularly critical: pre-existing levels of trust, the digital literacy of the citizenry, and the perceived effectiveness of the digital services themselves.

Pre-existing Trust Levels

E-governance initiatives are rarely deployed in a vacuum. More often, they are introduced into political environments where public trust in government has already been declining for decades. In contexts of high institutional mistrust, new digital platforms may be viewed with suspicion from their inception. For example, India’s first National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) faced significant limitations precisely because of a pre-existing “lack of public trust in e-governance services”. When citizens are already primed to believe the government is corrupt or incompetent, a new government app or website may be perceived not as a tool for empowerment, but as another potential vector for surveillance, data misuse, or inefficiency.

Digital Literacy and the Digital Divide

The promise of digital governance is inherently tied to the capacity of citizens to engage with it. Research from New Jersey demonstrates that the positive relationship between e-government and trust is significantly moderated by citizens’ digital literacy levels. Citizens who are more comfortable and proficient with digital tools are more likely to have positive experiences and, consequently, to see their trust in government enhanced. Conversely, a significant “digital divide,” a term referring to inequality in the power to access and process digital information, can severely undermine the trust-building potential of e-governance. In countries like Nepal, where internet access remains limited in many rural and marginalized communities, digital activism and engagement may not be representative of the broader population, creating an elitist dynamic where the voices of the most vulnerable are excluded. This not only limits the reach of digital services but can also breed resentment and deepen existing social inequalities, further eroding trust.

Perceived Effectiveness and Responsiveness

Ultimately, public trust is more strongly linked to the quality of the digital experience than to the mere availability or use of a service. Studies consistently emphasize the importance of user experience and positive evaluations of e-government effectiveness. E-government can increase trust when it demonstrably improves interactions with citizens and fosters a perception of government responsiveness and accountability. If digital services are poorly designed, unreliable, difficult to navigate, or fail to deliver on their promises, they can backfire, reinforcing negative perceptions of government incompetence and further damaging public confidence. The technology must work, and it must lead to tangible improvements in service delivery and citizen-government communication.

This complex web of evidence points to a crucial decoupling of trust in the digital age. Public trust is not a monolithic concept. Citizens can develop a narrow, process-based trust in a specific digital service—for instance, trusting an online tax portal to be efficient and secure—without that trust extending to the broader political institution.

The research from Australia and New Zealand, which found no correlation between trust in e-government services and trust in government itself, is a clear indicator of this phenomenon. This suggests that while e-government can enhance trust in theprocess of service delivery by improving interactions, it does not automatically translate into deeperinstitutional trust in the government’s motivations, integrity, or political leadership. The controversy surrounding Nepal’s National ID card provides a stark illustration. Even if the digital registration process were perfectly seamless and efficient, the public’s profound and legitimate concerns about data security, privacy, and the potential for state surveillance would likely override any process-based trust. Therefore, governments that pursue a purely technocratic approach, focusing on building functional digital services without addressing underlying deficits in political accountability and institutional integrity, will likely fail to meaningfully rebuild public trust.

Section 3: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism: When Transparency Tools Become Surveillance Mechanisms

The optimistic narrative of e-governance as a force for transparency and trust is fundamentally challenged by the dual-use nature of digital technology. The same infrastructure, databases, and platforms designed to open up government and empower citizens can be, and frequently are, weaponized for repression and social control. This section pivots to explore this darker aspect of digital governance, where the tools of transparency are inverted to become mechanisms of surveillance, and the promise of a more open society gives way to the reality of a more monitored one.

3.1. The Dual-Use Dilemma: From Service to Surveillance

The core of the dilemma lies in the centralization of information. E-government initiatives, by their nature, involve creating large, centralized databases of citizen information—from digital identity systems and tax records to health data and social media interactions. While this centralization is necessary for efficiency and service integration, it also creates a powerful tool for state surveillance. The proliferation of these technologies has “significantly expanded states’ toolkit for repression,” allowing regimes to monitor citizens, suppress dissent, and consolidate power with unprecedented sophistication.

This is not a hypothetical risk but an active strategy. The surveillance-based business model of major technology platforms, which collect vast amounts of user data, poses a systemic threat to human rights, as governments can either access this data directly or replicate the model for their own purposes. The result is a “chilling effect,” where the knowledge of being watched can scare people away from participating in social movements, criticizing the government, or exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The very technologies intended to build trust can thus become the primary instruments for eroding it.

3.2. The Global Toolkit of Digital Repression

Authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian regimes around the world are deploying a diverse and rapidly evolving toolkit of digital technologies to control their populations.

Mass Surveillance and Data Collection

Governments are increasingly harnessing AI-powered surveillance systems, including facial recognition and biometric tracking, to monitor public spaces and online activity. Sophisticated systems can rapidly trawl social media for signs of dissent, pairing massive datasets with facial scans to identify and track pro-democracy protesters. This is often justified under the broad and ambiguous pretext of “national security” or “public safety”. In Xinjiang, China, this technology is used to implement a pervasive system of monitoring and control over the Uighur Muslim minority.

Sophisticated Censorship and Disinformation

Artificial intelligence is being used to enhance and refine online censorship, making it more subtle, automated, and effective. Legal frameworks in at least 21 countries now mandate or incentivize digital platforms to use machine learning to remove disfavored political, social, and religious speech. Simultaneously, AI is supercharging state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. At least 47 governments were found to have deployed paid commentators or “troll armies” to manipulate online discussions in their favor, a number that has doubled in a decade. Generative AI tools make it cheaper and easier than ever to create and disseminate fake text, audio, and imagery to sow doubt and smear opponents.

Targeted Attacks with Spyware

Beyond mass surveillance, states are using highly invasive spyware to conduct targeted attacks against high-value individuals. Commercial spyware like NSO Group’s Pegasus can be surreptitiously installed on a target’s phone, granting the attacker complete access to the device’s messages, emails, microphone, camera, and location data. Investigations have revealed that this technology has been used globally to target human rights activists, journalists, and political leaders, effectively turning their own devices into 24/7 surveillance tools.

Internet Shutdowns as a Tool of Control

One of the bluntest but most effective tools of digital repression is the intentional disruption of internet or mobile services. Governments are increasingly resorting to internet shutdowns during politically sensitive periods such as protests, elections, or armed conflicts. These blackouts serve multiple purposes: they prevent citizens from organizing and mobilizing, they stop the flow of information about human rights abuses to the outside world, and they create an environment of fear and confusion. These shutdowns have dramatic and devastating impacts, crippling economies, disrupting access to essential services like healthcare and education, and directly violating fundamental human rights.

3.3. Exporting the Model: The China Blueprint

China stands out as both the world’s most advanced digital authoritarian state and the primary exporter of this model of governance. For eight consecutive years, Freedom House has ranked China as the worst environment for internet freedom, citing its “Great Firewall” as an alarmingly effective apparatus of censorship and surveillance.

Crucially, Beijing is no longer content to apply this model only within its borders. It is actively propagating its “techno-dystopian” vision abroad through several channels. It conducts large-scale trainings for foreign officials from dozens of countries on its methods of “cyberspace management”. Chinese tech companies, often with state backing, provide surveillance technology, including advanced facial recognition systems, to authoritarian governments around the world. Furthermore, Beijing leverages its economic power to compel international companies to abide by its censorship rules even when operating outside of China.

This global proliferation of digital authoritarianism is often cloaked in the legitimizing language of statecraft. Governments are increasingly framing repressive policies like data localization, mandatory platform registration, and internet shutdowns under the rubric of “digital sovereignty” or “national security”. This rhetoric co-opts the language of international law and national interest to provide a veneer of legitimacy for actions that are fundamentally aimed at suppressing dissent and controlling the information space. The justification for internet shutdowns, for example, is almost always “public safety” or “national security,” even when the documented trigger is a peaceful protest or an election. Similarly, the Nepali government’s rationale for its sweeping social media ban was framed in terms of legal compliance and regulation, while critics overwhelmingly viewed it as a politically motivated attempt to silence criticism. This strategic reframing represents a significant challenge. The fight for internet freedom is no longer just a battle against blunt censorship; it is a struggle against the legal and rhetorical architecture that states are building to normalize and justify digital repression.

Section 4: Case Study – Nepal: A Microcosm of the Global Digital Dilemma

The complex interplay between digital empowerment, public trust, and state control is not merely a theoretical construct; it is playing out in real-time across the globe. Nepal offers a particularly stark and illuminating case study of this dynamic. Over the past decade, the country’s digital sphere has evolved from a nascent space for communication into a vibrant public square and a primary battleground for the future of its democracy. The rise of a digitally savvy and politically engaged citizenry has been met with a series of increasingly assertive state measures aimed at regulating and controlling this new locus of power, illustrating the core paradox of digital governance.

4.1. The Rise of the Digital Public Sphere and Civic Mobilization

In Nepal, where over 40% of the population is under 25, social media platforms like Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok have become indispensable tools for youth-led political and social movements. These platforms have allowed a new generation of activists to bypass the traditional gatekeepers of information—state-controlled media and established political parties—to raise awareness, build solidarity, and mobilize for collective action with unprecedented speed and scale.

Several key movements highlight this trend.

The #BackOffIndia hashtag movement in 2015 united Nepalis online to protest perceived interference from their southern neighbor, demonstrating the power of digital platforms to forge a national consensus and “organize without organization”. In 2020, the “Enough is Enough” campaign emerged as a powerful youth-led protest against the government’s perceived mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated corruption. Organized almost entirely through Facebook groups and other social media, the movement translated virtual advocacy into tangible, peaceful street protests across the country, demanding accountability from political leaders.

Following the global #BlackLivesMatter protests, Nepali activists adeptly localized the conversation, using hashtags like #DalitLivesMatter to spark a national dialogue on the deeply entrenched issues of caste-based discrimination and police brutality within Nepal. These movements showcase a fundamental shift in civic engagement, where digital platforms have empowered citizens to set the public agenda and hold power to account.

4.2. The State Strikes Back: A Pattern of Digital Repression

The growing power of this digital public sphere did not go unnoticed by the state. The government’s response has been characterized not by engagement or dialogue, but by a pattern of escalating attempts to control and curtail the digital freedoms that enabled this new wave of activism. This reaction can be observed through two major policy initiatives: the controversial National Identity Card scheme and the sweeping social media ban of 2025.

The National ID Card Controversy

Launched in 2010 as a digital solution to improve record-keeping and service delivery, Nepal’s National ID card scheme has been mired in controversy and implementation failures.

A significant majority of citizens who have registered have not collected their physical cards, citing logistical hurdles, a lack of clear utility, and a fundamental lack of trust. The core of the controversy, however, lies in deep-seated concerns about data security and privacy. Cybersecurity experts have repeatedly warned of a lack of robust legal and technical safeguards to protect the sensitive biometric and personal data being collected. Many have drawn parallels to India’s problematic Aadhaar card, which has been plagued by massive data leaks and criticized as a tool for state surveillance.

The Nepali government’s move to make the National ID mandatory for accessing essential public services, including social security benefits and passports, was met with widespread public criticism and a legal challenge that temporarily halted its implementation, highlighting the deep public mistrust in the state’s ability or willingness to protect their data.

The September 2025 Social Media Ban

The culmination of the state’s efforts to control the digital sphere came in September 2025 with an abrupt and sweeping ban on 26 of the country’s most popular social media and communication platforms, including all Meta products (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), YouTube, and X. The government’s official rationale was regulatory: the platforms had failed to comply with a directive, backed by a Supreme Court order, requiring them to register with the Ministry of Communication, establish a local office, and pay taxes.

However, this regulatory justification was widely perceived as a pretext. Activists, journalists, opposition parties, and international rights groups condemned the move as a blatant attempt to control content, clamp down on free speech, and silence voices critical of the government. The ban was not an isolated incident but was seen as part of a broader, alarming pattern of proposed legislation aimed at undermining press freedom and civil liberties, including a counter-intelligence bill that would allow for arbitrary government surveillance of citizens’ digital communications.

4.3. The Fallout: Economic, Social, and Political Repercussions

The social media blackout had immediate and severe consequences, fracturing the country’s digital backbone.

The economic disruption was profound. Small and medium-sized businesses, which increasingly rely on platforms like Facebook and Instagram for marketing, sales, and customer communication, were cut off from their livelihoods overnight. Telecom operators, which derive a significant portion of their revenue from social media data traffic, reported massive financial losses. The ban also disrupted education, recruitment, and the vital tourism sector.

The social and civic disruption was equally damaging. The ban severed crucial communication channels, not only for political organizing but also for personal connections, particularly for Nepal’s large and growing diaspora community that relies on platforms like WhatsApp to stay in touch with family. It undermined the very tools that had given citizens a voice and a platform for solidarity against injustice.

The move was met with a fierce public and political backlash. The ban was greeted with “howls of protest” from across the political spectrum. Journalists and youth activists, self-identifying as “Gen Z,” quickly organized street protests against what they termed a “digitally repressive” move and a direct assault on their fundamental rights. The immediate and widespread surge in online searches for VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) signaled a clear public intent to circumvent state control and reclaim access to the global internet.

The case of Nepal vividly illustrates an “activism-repression spiral.” The timeline of events shows a clear feedback loop: the more effectively citizens used digital platforms to demand accountability and organize for social change, the more aggressively the state deployed its legislative and regulatory powers to curtail those platforms. The “Enough is Enough” and #DalitLivesMatter movements demonstrated a new form of citizen power that operated outside the state’s control. The state’s response—the controversial National ID scheme, a proposed surveillance bill, and ultimately the social media ban—was a direct reaction to this challenge. This repressive action, in turn, did not quell dissent but instead sparked a new wave of activism focused squarely on digital rights. This reveals that the government’s actions were not merely about “regulation”; they were a strategic attempt to reassert a monopoly on public discourse that had been fundamentally challenged by the democratizing power of digital platforms.

Section 5: Navigating the Double-Edged Sword: Policy Recommendations for Building Digital Trust

The central finding of this report is that technology’s impact on the relationship between citizens and the state is contingent on the political context and the policy choices that govern its use. Building genuine digital trust requires a multi-stakeholder approach that prioritizes human rights, fosters inclusivity, and commits to democratic accountability.

The following recommendations are designed to help governments, civil society, and the international community navigate the dual potential of digital platforms to foster a more transparent, accountable, and trustworthy digital future.

5.1. For Governments in Emerging Democracies (like Nepal)

• Adopt a “Rights-Respecting” Approach to Digitalization: The foundation of digital trust is the belief that the state will not misuse the data and tools at its disposal. Governments must therefore embed human rights principles, particularly the right to privacy, into the design of all e-governance initiatives from the outset.

• For critical infrastructure like national digital identity systems, this means moving beyond mere technical security to establish robust legal frameworks for data protection, create independent oversight bodies with real enforcement power, and ensure that participation is not coercive.
• Bridge the Digital Divide and Foster Digital Literacy: E-governance cannot build trust if its benefits are restricted to a privileged few. Governments must make significant, sustained investments in expanding affordable internet access to rural and marginalized communities. This must be paired with comprehensive digital literacy programs to equip all citizens with the skills needed to safely and effectively engage with digital services and critically evaluate online information. An inclusive digital society is a prerequisite for a trusted one.
• Foster Digital Dialogue, Don’t Shut It Down: Governments should view the digital public sphere as an opportunity for dialogue and co-governance, not as a threat to be controlled. Instead of resorting to censorship and shutdowns, authorities should actively use digital participation platforms (such as open-source tools like Consul or Decidim) to genuinely engage with citizens, solicit feedback on policies, and collaboratively improve public services. Internet shutdowns are an extreme and counterproductive measure that erodes trust, harms the economy, and violates fundamental rights. They should be treated as a measure of absolute last resort, permissible only under conditions of strict legal necessity and proportionality, and subject to independent judicial oversight.

5.2. For Civil Society, Activists, and Journalists

• Enhance Digital Security Hygiene: In an environment of increasing state surveillance, digital security is paramount. Activists and journalists must prioritize learning and implementing best practices for secure communication, including the use of end-to-end encryption, VPNs, and tools that protect against malware and phishing attacks. This is essential for mitigating the risks of targeted surveillance and hacking.
• Build Resilient and Diversified Networks: Over-reliance on a single platform or technology creates a single point of failure that can be exploited by state censorship. Civil society organizations should work to build resilient networks by diversifying their communication channels, utilizing a mix of centralized and decentralized platforms, and maintaining robust offline organizing capabilities to ensure continuity if digital channels are compromised.
• Leverage International Advocacy and Legal Mechanisms: Digital repression is a violation of international human rights law. Civil society should meticulously document instances of internet shutdowns, censorship, and the misuse of spyware, and use this evidence to engage with international human rights mechanisms, such as UN Special Rapporteurs. Putting a global spotlight on these abuses can generate diplomatic pressure on governments and hold complicit technology companies accountable for their role in enabling repression.

5.3. For International Bodies and Technology Companies

• Uphold Human Rights as a Core Business and Diplomatic Principle: Technology companies have a responsibility to respect human rights under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. They must conduct rigorous human rights impact assessments before entering new markets or launching new products and develop clear policies for pushing back against government demands that violate international standards for freedom of expression and privacy. Democratic governments, in turn, must make digital rights a central pillar of their foreign policy.
• Increase Transparency and Algorithmic Accountability: The private, algorithmic systems of major platforms wield immense power over public discourse. To build trust, these companies must increase transparency around their content moderation policies, their processes for responding to government requests, and the functioning of the algorithms that rank and recommend content. This includes allowing for independent, third-party audits of their systems to assess their impact on human rights.
• Sanction and Isolate Digital Authoritarianism: The international community must treat the export of surveillance technology and the normalization of repressive digital practices as a serious threat to global democracy. Democratic governments should use targeted sanctions, export controls, and other diplomatic and economic tools to discourage the sale of surveillance technology to abusive regimes and to create clear international norms against practices like internet shutdowns. A coalition of democracies must work together to counter the authoritarian vision for the internet and champion a positive alternative grounded in human rights and open access.

Conclusion: Technology as a Mirror of Politics

This report began with the central paradox of digital governance: its simultaneous capacity to foster transparency and to enable repression. The analysis has demonstrated that the resolution of this paradox is not found within the technology itself, but in the political context that surrounds it. Technology is not an independent variable that can be inserted into a society to mechanically produce trust or efficiency. It is a powerful amplifier, a mirror that reflects and magnifies the underlying values and intentions of the institutions that deploy it.

In societies with strong democratic traditions, robust legal safeguards, and a commitment to public accountability, digital tools can indeed enhance transparency, streamline services, and strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens. E-procurement platforms can reduce graft, open data can empower watchdogs, and digital services can make government more responsive. However, even in these contexts, the journey toward building trust is complex and fraught with challenges related to digital inclusion, data privacy, and the persistent gap between process-based and institutional confidence.

Conversely, in authoritarian or hybrid regimes where the state views citizen empowerment as a threat, the same technologies are readily weaponized for control. Centralized digital identity systems become tools of surveillance, communication platforms become targets for censorship, and the internet itself can be switched off to quell dissent. The case of Nepal serves as a powerful and timely illustration of this reality. The vibrant digital activism that blossomed on social media was perceived not as a sign of a healthy democracy, but as a challenge to state authority, provoking a repressive spiral that ultimately harmed the nation’s economy, its social fabric, and the very trust the government claimed to be building.

The conclusion is therefore unavoidable: the struggle for a transparent, accountable, and trustworthy digital future is fundamentally a political struggle, not a technical one. Building trust cannot be achieved by simply launching a new app or a data portal. It requires the difficult, non-technological work of strengthening democratic institutions, protecting fundamental human rights, fostering an independent judiciary, and empowering a vibrant and critical civil society. The contest over the governance of digital platforms is, in essence, a contest over the very nature of citizenship and state power in the 21st century. The digital sword will remain double-edged; whether it is used to build or to break trust will be determined by the political will to defend the principles of an open and democratic society.